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IS ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM A LEGITIMATE 
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST UNDER RATIONAL 
BASIS REVIEW? 
Roger V. Abbott+ 
Should states be allowed to require Benedictine monks to learn how to 
embalm corpses in order to sell wooden caskets?1  In many states, prospective 
hair braiders,2 casket retailers,3 interior designers,4 shampoo specialists,5 music 
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 1. For several alternative perspectives, see Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a 
Legitimate State Interest?  Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1023, 1023–24 (2006) (examining the scope of state regulation on an individual’s occupational 
freedom) and Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging 
Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 670 (2004) (arguing that some economic laws violate the Due Process 
Clause). 
 2. Currently, thirty states require a minimum of one thousand hours of training or class 
time to obtain a license to practice hair braiding.  See Valerie Bayham, A Drew Deferred: Legal 
Barriers to African Hairbraiding Nationwide, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/a-dream 
-deferred (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 3. The following states require a funeral directing or mortician’s license to sell caskets: 
Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.  See The Right to Urn an Honest Living: 
Challenging Tennessee’s Casket Monopoly, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/tennessee 
-caskets-background (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 4. According to the American Society of Interior Designers, twenty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted interior design licensure requirements.  See State Licensing 
Regulations, AM. SOC’Y OF INTERIOR DESIGNERS, http://www.asid.org/content/state-licensing 
-regulations (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 5. The Wall Street Journal reports that in Texas, shampoo specialists must take “150 hours 
of classes, 100 of them on the ‘theory and practice’ of shampooing, before they can sit for a 
licensing exam,” which awards points for things like hand sanitization, water temperature 
regulation, and thorough hair rinsing.  Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing 
State Approval Rise, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2011, at A1; see also Shampoo License Examination 
Candidate Information Bulletin, TEX. DEP’T OF LICENSING AND REGULATION (Dec. 2012), 
available at https://candidate.psiexams.com/bulletin/display_bulletin.jsp?ro=yes&actionname=83 
&bulletinid=169&bulletinurl=.pdf (outlining the shampoo-licensing examination procedures and 
requirements). 
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therapists,6 teeth whiteners,7 and massage therapists8 must meet arduous and 
expensive licensing requirements in order to go into business. 
These onerous regulations on professionals have multiplied over the past 
fifty years.9  According to one study, the percentage of U.S. workers required 
to obtain state licenses to practice a trade has increased from five percent in 
1950 to at least twenty percent in 2000 and to twenty-nine percent in 2006.10  
Many of these new regulations do not have a strong public health or safety 
rationale, but were passed at the behest of special interest groups seeking to 
keep competitors out of the market.11  For example, until 2010, prospective 
florists in Louisiana were required to pass a subjective floral exam 
administered by incumbent florists interested in keeping potential competitors 
out of the market.12  Similarly, prospective barbers in California are obligated 
to spend over $10,000 and achieve 1,500 hours of class credits to obtain a 
barber’s license.13 
																																																								
 6. In 2011, “[h]istory was made” when North Dakota and Nevada became the first two 
states to pass music therapy licensure legislation.  Music Therapy Licensure Legislation Signed 
into Law, AM. MUSIC THEORY ASS’N, http://www.musictherapy.org/music_therapy_licensure 
_legislation_signed_into_law/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 7. In June 2011, the Connecticut State Dental Commission passed a measure that allows 
only dentists to perform “on-site teeth whitening,” even though similar teeth-whitening products 
are available over the counter.  Jennifer Levitz, 4 out of 5 Dentists Think They Should Whiten 
Teeth, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011, at B1.  In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a 
lawsuit against the North Carolina Dental Board, alleging that prohibiting non-dentists from 
offering teeth-whitening services was anti-competitive behavior.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Complaint Charges Conspiracy to Thwart Competition in  
Teeth-Whitening Services (June 17, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/ncdental.shtm. 
 8. The vast majority of states and the District of Columbia have enacted massage therapy 
licensure or certification legislation.  See Massage State Regulation Guide, ASS’N. BODY WORK 
AND MASSAGE PROFS, available at http://www.massagetherapy.com/_content/careers/MTreg.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 9. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational 
Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 676, 676 (2010) (providing statistics from the Department 
of Labor and the U.S. Census). 
 10. Id. at 678. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing interest groups’ desire to maintain their market 
advantages by limiting competition). 
 12. See Leslie Turk, Jindal Strikes down Blooming Nonsense, INDEP. MEDIA GRP. (July 12, 
2010), http://www.theind.com/business/6564-jindal-strikes-down-blooming-nonsense (noting the 
abolishment of the subjective demonstration portion of the floral exam); see also Dick M. 
Carpenter II, Blooming Nonsense: Experiment Reveals Louisiana’s Florist Licensing Scheme as 
Pointless and Anti-competitive (Mar. 2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs 
/laflowerreportfinalsm.pdf (indicating that Louisiana’s “licensing scheme” simply shields current 
license holders from legitimate competition). 
 13. Simon, supra note 5 (describing California’s requirements for obtaining a barber’s 
license). 
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Supreme Court precedent affords states significant latitude to regulate 
occupations and implement intrastate licensing schemes. 14   Nevertheless, 
public interest firms engaging in strategic advocacy, such as the Institute for 
Justice, are contesting the outer limit of the states’ power to restrict the ability 
of individuals to enter an occupation.15  As a result, a three-way circuit split 
has emerged over whether pure economic protectionism of a particular 
industry is a legitimate government interest sufficient to withstand rational 
basis scrutiny or whether such measures violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.16  In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit struck down a Tennessee law requiring casket merchants to 
obtain a funeral-directing license.17  Although the Sixth Circuit stressed that 
rational basis review is a deferential standard, it relied in part on the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, which adopted 
an unusually rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny.18 
In contrast, in Powers v. Harris, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the reasoning in Craigmiles and held that a similar funeral-directing 
license requirement was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.19  The 
																																																								
 14. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791–93 (1975) (acknowledging that the 
states have “a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries,  
and . . . have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the 
practice of professions.”); see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per 
curiam) (noting that the state police powers give states broad authority to regulate their local 
economies); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 555 (1947) (upholding a 
Louisiana law that conditioned receiving a harbor pilot’s license on completion of an 
apprenticeship term, even though “with occasional exception, only relatives and friends of 
incumbent[]” pilots were selected as apprentices). 
 15. According to Chip Mellor, co-founder of the Institute for Justice, such strategic 
advocacy entails: 
[A] carefully planned, long-term program to restore constitutional protection for 
economic liberty.  It will be essential to identify licensing and permitting laws and 
other government-created barriers to entry that frame the economic liberty issue most 
compellingly.  We have high confidence in our ability to do this since we have been 
very successful in all of our cases in identifying the best possible factual settings and 
the most sympathetic clients. 
STEVEN M. TELES, RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 238 (2008) (footnote 
omitted). 
 16. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 
(10th Cir. 2004); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 17. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222, 228–29 (finding the provisions violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 18. Id. at 227 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)) 
(following the principle that legislation should employ the most direct and efficient means for 
achieving otherwise legitimate ends), superseded by statute, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3616, as recognized in Human Res. & Mgmt. Grp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 
687 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also infra Part I.A.2.ii (discussing Cleburne). 
 19. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221–23 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “absent a 
violation of a specific constitutional provision or other law, intrastate economic protectionism 
constitutes a legitimate state interest”); see infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the Powers court’s 
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Powers Court held that as long as protectionist state licensing regulations did 
not violate an express constitutional prohibition, or the Dormant Commerce 
Clause,20 they were per se constitutional under rational basis review.21 
In Merrifield v. Lockyer, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the per se rule adopted in Powers, striking down a pest-control licensing 
provision on the ground that it was “irrational” and thus in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.22  However, unlike Craigmiles, the Ninth Circuit did 
not rely on City of Cleburne, but rather adopted the more deferential form of 
rational basis review.23 
Finally, in March 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Abbey 
v. Castille joined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in holding that a licensing 
scheme, enacted solely to exclude competitors, was unconstitutional under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.24  
Like the Ninth Circuit, the St. Joseph Abbey court rejected the highly 
deferential approach taken by the Powers court.25 
This Comment will examine whether pure economic protectionism is a 
legitimate government interest sufficient to satisfy rational basis review.  Part I 
introduces the three standards of review that the Supreme Court has used to 
resolve due process and equal protection issues and highlights the contrasting 
approaches for applying rational basis review.  Part I also discusses the 
																																																																																																																																
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, which concluded that economic protectionism constituted a 
legitimate state interest). 
 20. Under the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a state law that is not 
explicitly preempted by federal law may be unconstitutional if it discriminates against or imposes 
a burden on interstate commerce.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 424–30 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 21. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1221–22 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s rejection of the 
Craigmiles approach and the application of deferential rational basis review with regard to 
licensing laws).  The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have followed suit.  See Locke v. Shore, 634 
F.3d 1185, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding a Florida licensure requirement for commercial 
interior design), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004 (2012); Brown v. Hovater, 561 F.3d 357, 367–69 
(4th Cir. 2009) (upholding Maryland’s Morticians Act, which prohibits corporate ownership of 
funeral establishments, with an exception for the fifty-eight existing corporations). 
 22. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “mere 
economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with respect to 
determining if a classification survives rational basis review”). 
 23. Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 985–86 & n.10 (finding that the Court’s approach in City of 
Cleburne was inapplicable). 
 24. Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2013 WL 1149579, at *7–9 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013) 
(finding that the State’s purported health and safety explanations for the regulation were 
“nonsensical” and “irrational”); see also Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 991–92 (holding that a state 
licensing scheme for pest removal irrationally exempted certain types of pest removal 
companies); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming that a Tennessee statute 
requiring funeral retail stores to employ a funeral director violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 25. Abbey, 2013 WL 1149579, at *5–6. 
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evolution of rational basis review within the context of economically 
protectionist state legislation and considers the developing circuit split 
regarding state licensing schemes passed solely to prevent competitors from 
entering the market.  Part II argues that the rationale for automatic deference 
under rational basis review is no longer justified in light of recent precedent.  
Part II also draws on public choice economic theory, arguing that the courts 
have the important ability to prevent licensing abuses that result from 
institutional weaknesses in the state legislative process.  Part III suggests that 
economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest and proposes a  
two-part test for determining the constitutionality of such legislation.  Part IV 
concludes by arguing that this two-part test is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent and can be cabined to prevent undue judicial interference with the 
legislative process. 
I.  EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF RATIONAL 
BASIS REVIEW 
A.  The Interpretive Challenge Posed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Generally, plaintiffs rely on both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when challenging the  
constitutionality of occupational licensing regulations.26  Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, “No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”27  The “any 
person” language of the Equal Protection Clause presents a difficult challenge 
for courts: because many laws draw distinctions among citizens, courts must 
determine not whether the law in question creates classifications, but whether 
the classifications are justified in light of the purpose behind the legislation.28 
																																																								
 26. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (addressing 
plaintiffs’ challenge to a Tennessee law requiring a license to sell funeral equipment on grounds 
that the statute violates their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment), aff’d, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause was also included 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individual rights, but it was essentially written out of the 
Constitution by the Slaughter-House Cases.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,  
74–75 (1873).  See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627–28 
(1994) (arguing that Justice Samuel Miller incorrectly weakened the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 28. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779–80 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the proper determination under the Equal Protection Clause is whether a legislative 
classification can be justified by the state’s legitimate purpose).  The use of the Equal Protection 
Clause to invalidate legislation is a relatively recent development.  Before Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court “rarely found any state or local action to violate the 
equal protection clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 668 
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1.  The Supreme Court Has Gradually Developed Three Standards of 
Review to Test the Constitutionality of State Legislation Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Between 1897 and 1937, a historical period known as the Lochner Era, the 
Supreme Court recognized the “freedom of contract” under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment29 and allowed states to regulate contracts 
only if such regulations directly affected certain policy interests, such as the 
health, safety, or morals of its citizens. 30   In determining whether this 
requirement was met, the Court weighed the public policy rationales behind 
the legislation and reached its own conclusions as to the wisdom or necessity 
of the law.31 
																																																																																																																																
(noting that the “promise” of the Equal Protection Clause “went unrealized for almost a  
century . . . .”).  Until the Warren Court Era, the Supreme Court only applied the Equal Protection 
Clause to racial and ethnic minorities.  See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81 
(construing the Equal Protection Clause “in light of the history of these amendments,” which was 
the protection of “the newly emancipated negroes”); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 357 
(1886) (invalidating a facially neutral law that was only enforced against Chinese persons, 
expanding the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to other minority groups); Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (invalidating a law that only allowed white males to serve on 
juries, but suggesting that the state could “confine the selection to males, freeholders . . . or 
persons having educational qualifications” without violating the Equal Protection Clause).  
Nevertheless, the Court’s understanding of the Equal Protection Clause was very narrow.  See, 
e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–52 (1896) (upholding a law mandating the 
segregation of railway accommodations because it was enacted in “good faith,” was not 
disparaging to African Americans, and did not confer “arbitrary power” on municipalities, as in 
Yick Wo), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Despite the Court’s 
constrained and deferential approach to the Equal Protection Clause, the Court adopted a much 
broader interpretation of the Due Process Clause.  See infra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
 29. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana law on 
freedom of contract grounds); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 610–20 (discussing 
economic substantive due process). 
 30. Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invalidating a New York law on 
maximum hours for bakery workers on “liberty of contract grounds”), overruled in part by 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962).  In fact, one scholar describes the Lochner decision as 
an “outlier,” stating that the Supreme Court “generally deferred to legislative innovation.”  DAVID 
E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1 (2011).  Bernstein argues that substantive due process was more 
aggressively advanced in the 1920s, when the Court not only invalidated economic legislation, 
but also struck down state laws abridging freedom of speech and parents’ right to raise and 
educate children.  Id. at 92–93. 
 31. According to Lochner, the role of the Court is to ask whether the law in question is “a 
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, 
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or 
to enter into those contracts . . . necessary for the support of himself and his family.”  Lochner, 
198 U.S. at 56 (rejecting the New York legislature’s conclusion that limiting the length of the 
bakers’ work week relates to the public health).  According to Justice James McReynolds, the 
Court “must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment.  At least, we must inquire concerning 
its purpose and decide whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within 
legislative power—whether the end is legitimate, and the means appropriate.”  Nebbia v. New 
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By the mid-1930s, the Court became more reluctant to question legislative 
prudence and generally presumed that all state legislation was constitutional, as 
long as it was not “arbitrary or capricious.” 32   This presumption, which 
foreshadowed the modern rational basis test, was very deferential to the states, 
although the Court suggested in United States v. Carolene Products Co. that it 
might apply closer scrutiny under certain circumstances.33 
Eventually, the Supreme Court developed three levels of judicial scrutiny.34  
The Court applies “strict scrutiny” to laws that distinguish individuals on the 
basis of invidious or “suspect” classifications—namely race, national origin, 
and alienage.35  Under strict scrutiny, the Court upholds a law only if it is the 
least restrictive means necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental 
interest. 36   The Court applies a more flexible “intermediate scrutiny” to 
legislation based upon “quasi-suspect” classifications, such as gender,  
																																																																																																																																
York, 291 U.S. 502, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).  Justice McReynolds also noted 
that the legislation in question, which would establish a price floor regime for milk, would not 
help dairy farmers, since the price-floor would not help reduce production.  Id.; cf. W. Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (contending that “[s]elf-
restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of judgment.  The check upon the judge is that 
imposed by his oath of office, by the Constitution, and by his own conscientious and informed 
convictions”). 
 32. See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 399; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
115 (1941) (holding that “[w]hatever the motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do 
not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress 
by the Commerce Clause”). 
 33. In a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court stated that a 
“narrower scope of the operation of the presumption of Constitutionality” might apply if: (1) 
“legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” (2) it 
“restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation,” and (3) if it is motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities.”  304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1937).  Over time, the Supreme Court crafted stricter 
standards of review “to protect . . . fundamental rights that were too important to be enforced only 
by a rational-basis test, but that the Supreme Court could not reasonably define as wholly 
categorical or unyielding.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1270 (2007); see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964). 
 34. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying 
rational basis review to mental disability discrimination), superseded by statute, Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3616, as recognized in Human Res. & Mgmt. Grp. 
v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), with Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination), and Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (applying strict scrutiny to racial classification). 
 35. See, e.g., Grantz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 331 (2003) (stating that “all racial 
classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 671–73. 
 36. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that race classifications are “only 
constitutional if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 687 (noting that discrimination based on 
race and national origin is analyzed under strict scrutiny). 
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sexual orientation, and illegitimacy. 37   Under intermediate scrutiny, such 
classifications are upheld only if they are substantially related to a significant 
government purpose.38  Finally, the Court reviews all other laws, including 
occupational licensing laws, under “rational basis scrutiny” and upholds a law 
as long as the classification employed is “rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”39 
2.  Two Approaches to Rational Basis Review 
i.  The Supreme Court Takes the “Scrutiny” out of Rational Basis Scrutiny 
in Williamson v. Lee Optical 
When the Court eventually rejected the interventionist approach of the 
Lochner Era, it adopted a method of reviewing whereby it applied a rebuttable 
presumption of constitutionality to state laws or ordinances passed pursuant to 
the police powers of the state.40  However, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, Inc., the Court altered its approach to a formalistic application of 
rational basis review.41 
In Lee Optical, the plaintiffs challenged an Oklahoma regulation that 
prohibited opticians from making prescription eyeglasses without a valid 
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.42  The law also made it 
illegal for eyeglass retailers to lease space to “any person purporting to do eye 
examination or visual care.” 43   Although the district court applied a 
presumption of constitutionality, it nevertheless held that the statute was 
invalid for three reasons. 44 
																																																								
 37. See e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender 
discrimination). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (per curiam) (1976) 
(defining rational basis review); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 672 (describing the 
rational basis test as the “minimum level of scrutiny”). 
 40. Under this standard, the Court only questions legislation if the plaintiff succeeded in 
affirmatively establishing that it was “unreasonable or arbitrary.”  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 530 (1934).  Thus in Carolene Products, the Court held that 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for 
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis with the knowledge and experience of 
the legislators. 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938) (footnote omitted). 
 41. 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (stating that the legislature, rather than the courts, should 
determine the advantages and disadvantages of a law). 
 42. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 131 & n.4 (W.D. Okla. 
1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 43. Id. at 131, 142. 
 44. Id. at 142. 
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First, the district court reasoned that the prohibition against making and 
repairing glasses without a prescription bore “no . . . rational relation to the 
actual vision of the public.” 45   Grinding lenses was “strictly artisan in 
character” and “require[d] no unusual professional judgment” associated with 
ophthalmology and optometry. 46   In addition, the court held that the law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it unreasonably discriminated 
against opticians by barring them from selling glasses without a prescription, 
but allowed the unsupervised sale of ready-to-wear glasses.47  Finally, the court 
found that forbidding eye-care professionals from renting retail space was “an 
arbitrary interference with the right of contract.”48 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and held 
that, under rational basis scrutiny, a court should not evaluate legislation unless 
it engages in “invidious discrimination.”49  The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement . . . . [b]ut it is for 
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of 
the new requirement.”50  The Court also held that a law is constitutional as 
long as its hypothetical purpose can be conceived, stating that “[i]t is enough 
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”51  Thus, the 
Court’s rationale in Lee Optical suggests that the constitutionality of 
legislation is only limited by the Court’s power of imagination.52 
																																																								
 45. Id. at 135, 143. 
 46. Id. at 135–37 (noting that the skills required in the present case do not require 
professional supervision). 
 47. Id. at 138–39 (finding no significant difference between purchasing new frames versus 
buying duplicate prescription eye glasses). 
 48. Id. at 142. 
 49. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
 50. Id. at 487 (holding that economic legislation “need not be in every respect logically 
consistent with its aims to be constitutional”). Justice William Douglas also made a scathing 
reference to the Lochner Era, stating that “[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and 
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought.”  Id. at 488. 
 51. Id. at 488.  The Court identified several potential purposes: 
The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions where a 
prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation. . . . [Or] the legislature 
might have concluded that eye examinations were so critical . . . that every change in 
frames and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a 
medical expert. 
Id. at 487. 
 52. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (holding that “[t]he 
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to 
the achievement of the State’s objective. . . . Statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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ii.  The Development of a More Searching Form of Rational Basis Review 
Occasionally, the Supreme Court deviates from the lenient approach to 
rational basis review that it applied in Lee Optical by applying a more 
searching form of rational basis scrutiny.53  For instance, the Court has been 
less deferential to legislation that specifically targets unpopular groups.54 
In City of Cleburne, the Court purported to apply rational basis review to an 
ordinance that denied a permit for a group home for individuals with mental 
disabilities.55  The Cleburne Court—like the Lochner Court—looked to the 
legislature’s motive and held that the law was “irrational” and not pursuant to 
any “legitimate [state] interest.”56 
B.  The Application of Rational Basis Review to Protectionist State Legislation 
It is well established that the power to regulate professions falls within the 
states’ police power.57   This principle comports with the Supreme Court’s 
modern understanding of the Equal Protection Clause: that state economic 
legislation is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state 
purpose.58 
Although the Lee Optical Court held that the judiciary should review state 
economic legislation challenged under the Equal Protection Clause in a very 
deferential manner, it was unclear on the extent to which the Court would 
apply this relaxed framework to state licensing regulations.59  In Morey v. 
Doud, a decision rendered just two years after Lee Optical, the Court 
invalidated an Illinois licensing requirement under the Equal Protection 
																																																								
 53. See Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 
37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 65 (1992) (concluding that “two distinctly different standards are at work in 
the Court’s rational basis analysis, causing unpredictable results depending upon which standard 
the Court chooses to apply in a particular case”); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with 
Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 802 (1987) (contending that 
“rational basis with bite . . . is merely intermediate scrutiny by another name”). 
 54. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (abrogating a Colorado 
constitutional amendment that barred the passage of anti-discrimination laws designed to protect 
homosexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (invalidating 
an ordinance that denied a permit for a group home for people with mental disabilities), 
superseded by statute, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3616, as 
recognized in Human Res. & Mgmt. Grp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 n.15 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down a 
provision of the Food Stamp Act that excluded households in which unrelated individuals lived). 
 55. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435, 447 (finding that “a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate, 
but . . . under that standard the ordinance is invalid as applied in this case”). 
 56. Id. at 448–50. 
 57. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining that states have the discretion to 
create their own licensing laws). 
 58. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that 
the Court “consistently defers to legislative determinations” when “local economic regulation is 
challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 59. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
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Clause.60  In fact, the Court did not apply the logic of Lee Optical to licensing 
regulations until 1976 in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, when it overturned 
Morey.61 
1.  The Court Establishes the Modern Deferential Approach to Protectionist 
State Legislation in City of New Orleans v. Dukes 
In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected Morey’s 
holding that suggested the possibility of challenging licensing laws on equal 
protection grounds.62  In Dukes, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
New Orleans permit scheme that prohibited the operation of pushcart vendors 
with an exception for vendors who had been in business for at least eight 
years.63  The Fifth Circuit, following Morey, invalidated the ordinance on the 
ground that the grandfather provision violated the Equal Protection Clause.64 
Characterizing the grandfather clause as “solely an economic regulation,” 
the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that states enjoy “wide latitude in the 
regulation of their local economies under their police power.”65  The Court 
concluded that states must be afforded discretion even if the solutions they 
adopt are imperfect, or only partly address a “perceived evil.”66  Reverting to 
the broad discretion allowed in Lee Optical, the Court held that “in the local 
economic sphere, only invidious discrimination” is inconsistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment.67 
2.  Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Approach Outlined in 
Dukes and Lee Optical 
Recent Supreme Court decisions invalidating state economic regulations on 
equal protection grounds, despite the absence of any invidious classifications, 
																																																								
 60. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 469 (1957) (invalidating the Illinois Community 
Currency Act on equal protection grounds because the law exempts American Express from the 
license requirement for firms dealing in money orders), overruled by City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam). 
 61. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 306 (reversing Morey because it “departs from proper equal 
protection analysis”); see infra Part I.B.1 (discussing Dukes). 
 62. In Dukes, the Court pointed out that Morey “was the only case in the last half century to 
invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on equal protection grounds.”  Dukes, 427 U.S. at 
306 (emphasis added); see also Morey, 354 U.S. at 469. 
 63. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 298–99. 
 64. Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 711–13 (5th Cir. 1974) (following Morey 
by holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by conferring a monopoly on a 
“favored class member,” thereby engaging in “statutory discrimination” against other vendors), 
rev’d, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
 65. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303. 
 66. Id. at 303–04. 
 67. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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have undermined the deferential precedents established by Dukes and Lee 
Optical.68 
i.  The Court Invalidates a Facially Neutral Valuation System that Results 
in the Disproportionate Treatment of Similarly Situated Properties 
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, a group of 
landowners challenged the method used by the West County assessor to 
valuate their property.69  The assessors valuated the property based on the most 
recent purchase price and made only small adjustments for land not recently 
sold.70  This system resulted in grossly disproportionate tax rates because it 
valued recently purchased properties higher than other comparative properties 
in the same county.71  In two cases (consolidated on appeal), the Circuit Court 
of Webster County found that the valuation violated the West Virginia 
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72  
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding no “intentional 
and systematic” discrimination.73 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the Webster County Circuit 
Court and reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that even if the valuation was 
accurate, it violated the Equal Protection Clause by subjecting the property 
owners to discriminatory treatment by taxing them at a much higher rate than 
similarly situated property owners.74  In contrast to Dukes and Lee Optical, the 
																																																								
 68. See supra notes 49–52, 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing the deferential 
holdings in Dukes and Lee Optical); infra part I.B.2.i–iii (highlighting recent Supreme Court 
decisions that undermine the deferential approach of Dukes and Lee Optical). 
 69. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 338, 340–41 (noting that, although minor adjustments were made in the 
valuation of properties not recently sold, they did not amount to significant increases). 
 72. See id. at 339–40 (concluding that “petitioners’ tax assessments over the years were 
dramatically in excess of those for comparable property in the county”); see also W. VA. CONST. 
art. X, § 1 (requiring that “[s]ubject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation shall be 
equal and uniform throughout the state, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law”). 
 73. In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 564–65 (W. Va. 
1987) (internal quotations omitted), rev’d sub nom. Alleghany Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. 336 
(1989). 
 74. Alleghany Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345–46 (holding that “the fairness of one’s 
allocable share of the total property tax burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by 
comparison with the share of others . . . . The relative undervaluation of comparable property in 
Webster County over time . . . denies petitioners the equal protection of the law”).  The Court also 
found that the discrepancies were not temporary, but had continued “for more than [ten] years 
with little change.”  Id. at 344. 
However, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent with this decision: just three years later, it 
upheld a California law that was almost identical in its effects to the tax commissioner’s practice 
in Allegheny.  See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 4–6, 17–18 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (noting the similarities of the California statute and the practice 
by the Commissioner in Allegheny, but upholding the California statute on the ground that 
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Court did not attempt to identify the motive behind the state employees’ 
adoption of the particular assessment method in question.75 
ii.  The Court Holds that Discriminating Against Out-of-State Firms to 
Promote Domestic Industry Is Not a Legitimate State Purpose 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court held that an Alabama 
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a much lower tax on 
the gross premiums of in-state insurance companies than on  
out-of-state companies, even though the statute allowed foreign firms to reduce 
the tax differential by acquiring Alabama assets and securities.76  Because both 
parties stipulated that this law was rationally related to the state’s purpose of 
promoting the domestic insurance industry and encouraging capital investment 
in Alabama, the only issue before the Court was whether this purpose was 
legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause.77  The Court held that promoting 
these goals “by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a 
legitimate state purpose” and thus unconstitutional, even under rational basis 
review.78 
iii.  The Court Invalidates an Arbitrary Zoning Condition as 
Unconstitutional Under the Equal Protection Clause 
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the plaintiff alleged that the Village of 
Willowbrook had arbitrarily conditioned her request to connect her property to 
the municipal water supply on her granting a thirty-three-foot easement to the 
																																																																																																																																
judicial interference is generally unwarranted unless it is found that the law in question is 
arbitrary); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 642 (supporting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nordlinger and stating that a law should be upheld as long as the Court can conceive 
of a legitimate purpose and rational basis for the law).  Nonetheless, the Court did not directly 
overturn Allegheny.  See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18, 21, 28.  In fact, the Court revived Allegheny 
by relying on its reasoning in a subsequent case.  Id.; see Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 
562, 564 (2000). 
 75. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304–05 (1976) (identifying 
hypothetical reasons that would support the city ordinance’s constitutionality); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (highlighting the rationales of the Oklahoma 
legislature that would support the state law’s constitutionality); see also Alleghany Pittsburgh 
Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 344–46 (noting that the county assessor appeared to apply the method on 
her own initiative, rendering the method in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 76. 470 U.S. 869, 871–72, 883 (1985). 
 77. See id. at 871, 875–76, 882 (stating that the issue in this case was whether Alabama’s 
domestic preference tax statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because the appellant had 
waived his right to an evidentiary hearing on the rationality of the law, resulting in a stipulation 
that the law was rationally related to its purpose). 
 78. See id. at 875, 882–83.  The contrast between Metropolitan Life and earlier Supreme 
Court decisions is striking.  For instance, the Court had previously stated that “[s]tate legislatures 
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their 
laws result in some inequality.”  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) 
(upholding Maryland’s Sunday-closing laws); see also supra note 52. 
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Village.79  Previously, the Village had only required a fifteen-foot easement 
from other similarly situated property owners.80  The plaintiff brought suit 
against the Village, alleging that the demand for an additional easement 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.81  The Supreme Court held that although 
the plaintiff “did not allege membership in a class or group,” the Equal 
Protection Clause provided a cause of action for “a class of one.”82  Therefore, 
despite the absence of any invidious classifications, the Court affirmed the 
judgment of the Seventh Circuit and found that the plaintiff sufficiently stated 
a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.83 
C.  A Circuit Split Emerges over the Appropriate Form of Rational Basis 
Review to Be Applied to Protectionist Licensing Regulations 
Although the Court has not yet determined what limits exist on states’ power 
to regulate professions within state boundaries, a three-way circuit split 
between the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits has emerged on the issue.84 
1.  The Sixth Circuit Rules that “Naked” Protectionism Is Not a Legitimate 
State Purpose Under Rational Basis Review 
In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Sixth Circuit held that a Tennessee law requiring 
casket retailers to be licensed funeral directors violated the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses because it had no plausible health or consumer 
protection justification.85  The facts in Craigmiles are striking.86  In order to 
become a licensed funeral director, plaintiffs—who simply wished to sell 
caskets—were required to complete either: (1) a two-year apprenticeship; or 
																																																								
 79. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  Olech also alleged that the Village’s demand was motivated by her previous, 
successful action against the Village in an unrelated lawsuit.  Id.  Her claim was further 
strengthened by the Village eventually agreeing to only a fifteen-foot easement.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 564–65 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 563–65 (affirming the judgment below, but refusing to consider the appellant’s 
alternative theory of “subjective ill will” relied on by the Seventh Circuit). 
 84. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 
1208 (10th Cir. 2004); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d, 312 
F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 85. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227–29. 
 86. William Mellor, President of the Institute for Justice (which provided pro-bono counsel 
to the plaintiff in Craigmiles), stated that the facts of the case offered “the perfect opportunity to 
ask a court to examine the full scope of the privileges or immunities clause.”  Steve France, Dusty 
Doctrines, 87 ABA J. 46, 47 (May 2001).  Although the Sixth Circuit remarked that the Supreme 
Court appeared to be open to the possibility of revitalizing the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Constitution, it found it unnecessary to reach that argument because the case could be 
decided on other grounds.  Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,  
510–11, 521–23 (1999)) (holding that the due process and equal protection claims were sufficient 
to decide the case but recognizing that the Supreme Court may re-evaluate the scope of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
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(2) one-year of course work at an accredited mortuary school, followed by a 
one-year apprenticeship and an examination.87 
The State of Tennessee argued that the licensing requirement was needed to 
safeguard the public health from poor quality caskets and to protect consumers 
who may be vulnerable to aggressive sales tactics after the loss of a loved 
one.88  Despite applying rational basis review, the Sixth Circuit rejected both 
rationales, noting that the Tennessee law did not advance the state’s health and 
safety interests because the law did not regulate casket design or quality, and 
moreover, because casket sellers did not engage in funeral services, such as 
arranging funeral ceremonies or embalming corpses.89  As a result, the court 
invalidated the requirement, noting that it was merely designed to protect “the 
monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers.”90 
2.  The Tenth Circuit Rejects Craigmiles and Applies the Deferential 
Rational Basis Test of Lee Optical to Interstate Licensing Laws 
In Powers v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit reversed an Oklahoma law that, like 
the law in Craigmiles, required individuals to obtain a license to sell caskets.91  
The court did not consider whether the means chosen was rationally related to 
the purpose articulated by the state, 92  but simply held that “intra-state 
economic protectionism, absent a violation of specific federal statutory or 
constitutional provision, is a legitimate state interest.”93  Moreover, the Powers 
court criticized the Sixth Circuit for “focus[ing] heavily on the . . . actual 
																																																								
 87. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.  For candidates who opted to attend mortuary school, 
classes included embalming, “restorative art,” and the performance of funeral services.  Id.; see 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-305 (West 2009) (defining the requirements for a funeral-directing 
license). 
 88. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225–26. 
 89. Id. at 228–29 (holding that “to privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense 
of consumers is not animated by a legitimate governmental purpose and cannot survive even 
rational-basis review”). 
 90. Id. at 229.  The court found that “dedicating two years and thousands of dollars” to 
obtain a license is a substantial barrier to entry.  Id. at 226.  It concluded, in light of the dubious 
justifications offered by the defendants, that “the 1972 amendment adding the retail sale of 
funeral merchandise to the definition of funeral directing was nothing more than an attempt to 
prevent economic competition.”  Id. at 225. 
 91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.3a (2010); 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).  According 
to the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act (FLSA), a funeral director is “a person who: 
sells funeral service merchandise to the public . . . .”  OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.2(2)(d); see 
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211 n.2.  The law only applies to caskets and not other funeral merchandise, 
such as urns.  Id. at 1212. 
 92. The only issue the court chose to address was “whether protecting the intrastate funeral 
home industry, absent a violation of a specific constitutional provision or a valid federal statute, 
constitutes a legitimate state interest.”  Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218. 
 93. Id. at 1222.  As the Powers court colorfully noted, “while baseball may be the national 
pastime of the citizenry, dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries 
remains the favored pastime of state and local governments.”  Id. at 1221 (footnote omitted). 
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motives of the Tennessee legislature”94 and asserted that the Supreme Court 
allows states to protect favored domestic interests.95 
3.  The Ninth Circuit Rejects Powers but Purportedly Relies on Traditional 
Rational Basis Review to Invalidate a California Licensing Scheme 
In Merrifield v. Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit confronted a California law that 
required practitioners of non-pesticide-based pest control96 to obtain a license 
through a two-year process. 97   A 1995 amendment exempted from this 
requirement those operators “engaged in the live capture and removal or 
exclusion of vertebrate pests, bees, or wasps from a structure without the use of 
pesticides,” defining vertebrates narrowly to include animals such as “bats, 
raccoons, skunks, and squirrels,” but not “mice, rats, or pigeons.” 98   The 
Structural Pest Control Board ordered the plaintiff, who fell outside the 
exemption, to cease and desist practicing his trade.99 
The plaintiff argued that the licensing law, as applied to structural pest 
control, violated the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal 
Protection Clauses because the required training and a majority of the 
examination questions were irrelevant to his line of work.100  He also asserted 
that the licensing requirement arbitrarily did not apply to pest control of bats, 
raccoons, skunks, and squirrels, but applied to mice, rats, and pigeons.101 
Although the Ninth Circuit held that California’s licensing law was 
rationally related to the legitimate public safety interests of the state,102 the 
court held that the selective definition of “vertebrates” violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.103  The court found that “this type of singling out . . . fails to 
																																																								
 94. Id. at 1223 (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 95. See id. at 1220 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963)). 
 96. The law regulates “structural pest control,” which includes non-pesticide-based pest 
control operators because the definition of structural pest control includes the use of mechanical 
devices used to eliminate pests.  Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 8520 (West 2008).  Practicing without a license is a 
misdemeanor offense, with each offense punishable by fines up to $1,000 and six months’ 
imprisonment.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 8553 (West 2008); see Merrifield, 547 F.3d at  
980–81. 
 98. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 8555(g) (West 2008); see Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 981–82. 
 99. Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 981 (requiring the plaintiff to obtain a “Branch II license” before 
Board officials would consider his bid “to birdproof the Trans Bay Terminal in San Francisco”). 
 100. Id. at 982–83. 
 101. Id. at 988–89.  The plaintiff argued that the licensing requirements were irrelevant 
because they applied predominantly to pesticide-based pest control rather than pesticide-free pest 
control.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 988 (concluding that the requirements “have a connection to competence in the 
field, and therefore satisfy rational basis review”). 
 103. Id. at 992.  In doing so, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s privileges and immunities 
claim.  Id. at 983–84 (finding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only protects the right to travel). 
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meet the relatively easy standard of rational-basis review.”104  Looking at the 
legislative history, the court also found that the exclusion of mice, rats, and 
pigeons from the exemption “was designed to favor economically certain 
constituents at the expense of others similarly situated.”105  The court refused 
to follow the rationale in Powers, and accordingly invalidated the licensing 
requirement—to the extent it excludes mice, rats, or pigeons—on equal 
protection grounds.106 
Although the Ninth Circuit recited quotes from the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Lee Optical and Dukes, its reasoning more closely resembled the 
district court in Lee Optical, which stated: “The legislature must not blow both 
hot and cold!  If it be desirable for the public protection that opticians sell 
merchandise and service only upon written prescriptive authority, the 
legislature cannot at the same time permit the unsupervised sale of  
ready-to-wear . . . eyeglasses.”107   Rather than allowing the legislature to 
reform “one step at a time,” the Ninth Circuit struck down the exemption.108  
Although one might argue that Oklahoma’s failure to regulate ready-to-wear 
eyeglasses is more likely to be an oversight than the kind of intentional 
decision of the California legislature to selectively define “vertebrates,” 
Merrifield runs counter to the sweeping language of the Supreme Court in Lee 
Optical.109 
4.  The Fifth Circuit Follows the Sixth and Ninth Circuits and Holds that 
Economic Protectionism Is Not a Legitimate State Purpose 
The facts in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille are almost identical to those in 
Craigmiles and Powers.110  In St. Joseph Abbey, Benedictine monks wanted to 
support their abbey by manufacturing and selling wooden coffins, but were 
obstructed by a Louisiana law that required individuals to obtain  
																																																								
 104. Id. at 991. 
 105. Id. (highlighting the law’s irrational exclusion of three types of vertebrate pests from all 
other vertebrates). 
 106. Id. at 991 n.15, 992 (holding that economic protectionism for its owns sake cannot stand 
as a basis for furthering a legitimate government interest). 
 107. Id. at 988–89; Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 139 (W.D. 
Okla. 1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub. nom. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 108. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489 (noting that legislatures enact reforms that “may take one 
step at a time”). 
 109. According to Lee Optical, “the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with 
its aims to be constitutional. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a 
remedy there, neglecting the others.”  Id. at 487–89 (citation omitted).  Moreover, it is doubtful 
that the failure of the Oklahoma legislature to regulate ready-to-wear eyeglasses was simply an 
oversight—the legislation as a whole was clearly designed to protect ophthalmologists and 
optometrists from the competition of opticians.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 642 
(speculating that “[i]n all likelihood, the Oklahoma law was adopted to protect business for 
optometrists and ophthalmologists and was not motivated by a desire to improve health”). 
 110. See Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2013 WL 1149579, at *1–3 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 
2013); text accompanying supra notes 85–95 (describing the facts of Craigmiles and Powers). 
492 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:475 
funeral-directing licenses in order to become casket retailers.111  The Abbey 
invested two-hundred thousand dollars to build “Saint Joseph Woodworks,” 
but shortly before it was due to open, the state Board of Embalmers and 
Funeral Directors ordered it to cease and desist for violating the licensing 
law.112  The Abbey attempted to obtain a legislative concession, but the funeral 
lobby successfully blocked the effort.113 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana followed 
Craigmiles and found that “economic protectionism standing alone does not 
provide a per se rational basis to pass constitutional muster.”114  In so doing, 
the court rejected the claim made in Powers that state legislation should be 
upheld simply because it protected an industry.115  The district court contrasted 
the facts of St. Joseph Abbey from Dukes116 and Lee Optical,117 holding that 
the Louisiana law did not support any colorable health or consumer safety 
purpose.118  Thus, the court concluded that “the only protection afforded by the 
Act is the economic protection of the funeral directors . . . .”119 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially withheld judgment “in the interest of 
federalism and constitutional avoidance” and sua sponte certified the following 
question of state law: “Whether Louisiana law furnishes the Louisiana State 
Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors with authority to regulate casket 
sales when made by a retailer who does not provide any other  
funeral services.” 120   However, after the Louisiana Supreme Court denied 
																																																								
 111. Under Louisiana law, “funeral directing” includes “the purchase of caskets or other 
funeral merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof . . . .”  LA. REV. STA. § 37:831(37) 
(2012); see Abbey, 2013 WL 1149579, at *1, 6. 
 112. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153–54 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, No. 
11-30756, 2013 WL 1149579 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013).  Under the law, persons who engage in 
unlicensed casket retail sales face fines up to $2,500 and 180 days imprisonment per casket.  Id. 
 113. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 10-2717, 2011 WL 1361425, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 
2011). 
 114. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 115. Compare St. Joseph Abbey, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (finding “no basis to create a per se 
rule of law that economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest”), with Powers v. Harris, 379 
F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “intrastate economic protectionism, absent a 
violation of a specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state interest”). 
 116. The district court noted that anti-pushcart legislation upheld in Dukes had a legitimate 
objective of promoting the tourism industry, even though a grandfather clause exempted several 
vendors from the regulation.  See St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *8. 
 117. The district court similarly approved of the Oklahoma legislation in Lee Optical, 
holding that it had a public health care objective, including encouraging frequent eye 
examinations.  See St. Joseph Abbey, 2011 WL 1361425, at *8–9. 
 118. See St. Joseph Abbey, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 158–59 (holding that there was no rational 
relationship between the licensing requirement and the public health and consumer protection 
purposes because Louisiana residents could purchase caskets online and were not even required to 
use caskets for burial). 
 119. Id. at 160. 
 120. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 168–69 (5th Cir. 2012), (“Should the 
Louisiana Supreme Court accept the certification and find a lack of authority its ruling will 
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certification, 121  the Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.122 
II.  THE RATIONALE FOR AUTOMATIC DEFERENCE UNDER RATIONAL BASIS 
REVIEW CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
A.  Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Require a Per Se Rule Upholding 
Protectionist Laws 
1.  The Court Has Been Skeptical of Laws that Target or Single out Groups 
for No Rational Purpose 
According to the Tenth Circuit in Powers, “[h]ornbook constitutional law 
provides that if Oklahoma wants to limit the sale of caskets to licensed funeral 
directors, the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it.”123  The expansive 
dictum in Lee Optical and Dukes supports Powers’ implication that under 
rational basis review, the government always wins. 124   Under this 
understanding, state economic legislation not expressly forbidden by the 
Constitution or preempted by federal law is constitutional, unless it employs 
one of the narrowly defined “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classifications.125 
However, the Court has also been skeptical of laws that target or single out 
groups for no rational purpose.126  For instance, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Co., the Court struck down a county tax assessor’s practice that resulted in 
widely divergent tax assessments for properties of similar value.127  In Olech, 
the Court rejected a law that arbitrarily demanded an easement that was twice 
																																																																																																																																
resolve the case in its entirety. Should it reach a contrary conclusion, this Court will no longer 
stay its hand but will promptly proceed to judgment.”), certification denied, 106 So. 3d 542 (La. 
2013). 
 121. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 106 So. 3d 542 (La. 2013). 
 122. The Fifth Circuit, like the district court, found that the State’s proferred health and 
safety justifications failed to withstand even rational basis scrutiny.  Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-
30756, 2013 WL 1149579, at *8 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013) (“The funeral directors have offered no 
rational basis for their challenged rule and, try as we are required to do, we can suppose none.”); 
see supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
 123. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211 (citation omitted). 
 124. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“When local economic 
regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently 
defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discrimination.”); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955). 
 125. Constitutional law scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, reaches a similar conclusion: “The 
reality is that virtually any law can meet this very deferential requirement.”  CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 20, at 641. 
 126. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d 
sub nom. Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2013 WL 1149579 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 127. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1989); see 
also supra Part I.B.2.i (discussing the Supreme Court’s ruling). 
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the size of what had been demanded of similarly situated neighbors.128  These 
cases are not mere outliers; between 1970 and 2010, plaintiffs have prevailed 
under rational basis scrutiny in seventeen equal protection cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, despite the absence of any “invidious” discrimination.129 
Overinclusive laws can also violate the Equal Protection Clause because 
“sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are 
																																																								
 128. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (holding that a 
homeowner, who had been subject to an arbitrary demand by the village zoning authorities, could 
assert an equal protection claim as a class of one); see also supra Part I.B.2.iii. 
 129. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (striking down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that barred the passage of anti-discrimination laws designed 
to protect homosexuals); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 108–09 (1989) (holding that the property 
requirement for serving on a government board violated the plaintiff’s equal protection rights); 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345–46 (invalidating a county tax assessor’s practice 
that resulted in widely divergent tax assessments for properties of similar value); City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance excluding 
group homes for mentally handicapped persons), superseded by statute, Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3616, as recognized in Human  
Res. & Mgmt. Grp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp. 2d 237, 256 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Hooper 
v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (invalidating a New Mexico tax 
exemption for honorably discharged Vietnam veterans that only applied to veterans who were 
New Mexico residents before May 8, 1976); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1985) 
(striking down a Vermont tax exemption that applied to Vermont residents who had purchased a 
car in-state); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880–81 (1985) (invalidating a state law 
that taxed in-state insurance companies at much lower rates than out-of-state companies); Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that Texas had no substantial interest in barring the 
children of illegal aliens from attending public schools); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64–65 
(1982) (striking down an Alaskan dividend distribution program that favored established residents 
over new residents); Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977) 
(striking down a freeholder qualification to be a commissioner on the Greater Baton Rouge 
Airport Commission); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down a 
provision of the Food Stamp Act that excluded households containing individuals unrelated to 
each other); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1972) (invalidating a recoupment statute 
that compelled indigents to pay for counsel in civil cases); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,  
77–78 (1972) (holding that the double-bond prerequisite for appealing an Oregon Forcible Entry 
and Wrongful Detainer action violated the Equal Protection Clause by classifying real property 
tenants differently than other tenants); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971) 
(holding that the distinction between felony and non-felony drawn by Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 607(b) was an “unreasoned distinction proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971)  (holding that,  under rational basis review, an Idaho probate 
statute governing the designation of administrators of an estate violated equal protection by 
favoring men over women); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1970) (holding that the 
freeholder requirement for school board membership was invidiously discriminatory and violated 
the Equal Protection Clause). In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor argued that the Texas 
anti-sodomy statute should be struck down on equal protection grounds rather than substantive 
due process.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also 
Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term 
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (1999). 
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different as though they were exactly alike.”130  Licensing regulations passed 
to confer special privileges on political favorites is one such example. 131  
Although the state may have some colorable health or safety interest in 
regulating certain occupations (such as vision care or embalming), 132  its 
interest in the regulation of ancillary occupations or the sale of merchandise 
incidental to the regulated occupation (such as eyeglasses or caskets) is 
dubious.133 
2.  The Supreme Court Has Been Appropriately Skeptical of Protectionist 
Legislation 
Supreme Court precedent does not support the holding in Powers that 
protectionism is a legitimate state purpose.134  In Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., the Court struck down an Alabama law that taxed out-of-state insurance 
companies at a much higher rate than in-state companies.135  Although the 
Court has struck down similar legislation as incompatible with the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,136 its decision to invalidate the Alabama statute on equal 
protection grounds evinces a clear hostility toward economic protectionism.137 
																																																								
 130. Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Jenness v. 
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (invalidating a California 
regulation that compelled hair braiders to obtain a cosmetology license). 
 131. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955) (vision 
care); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (embalming). 
 133. Licensing requirements on purveyors of tangentially related goods or services are 
frequently added well after the original licensing scheme is implemented.  See, e.g., Craigmiles, 
312 F.3d at 222 (noting that the law was amended to include regulation of the sale of 
merchandise).  Although the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles conceded that the legislature is not 
required to be perfectly consistent or logical, the court found that “[b]y specifically amending the 
Act . . . to cover the sale of funeral merchandise, the legislature specifically brought casket 
retailers under the coverage of the licensing scheme . . . . This specific action . . . appears directed 
at protecting licensed funeral directors from retail price competition.”  Id. at 227 (discussing inter 
alia how regulations passed under the guise of protecting certain industries or consumers have 
been struck down). 
 134. See infra notes 135–53 and accompanying text. 
 135. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985) (finding that “acceptance of [the 
state’s] contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a legitimate state purpose under 
equal protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.  A State’s 
natural inclination frequently would be to prefer domestic business over foreign.”). 
 136. For example, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court observed that “where 
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity 
has been erected.”  437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey statute that barred 
importing out-of-state solid or liquid waste on commerce clause grounds). 
 137. The Court has employed similar language in other constitutional contexts.  For instance, 
in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., the Court held that “[i]f the state 
regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant 
and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation . . . . The requirement of a legitimate public 
purpose guarantees that the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to 
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3.  The Circuit Split over the Constitutionality of Protectionist Licensing 
Laws Highlights Two Requirements for Constitutionality Under Rational 
Basis Review 
Under rational basis review, legislation is constitutional if it is passed 
pursuant to a legitimate government interest and is rationally related to that 
interest.138  In addressing the licensing restrictions, the, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits blurred these two components together, or emphasized one to 
the near exclusion of the other.139 
In Merrifield, the Ninth Circuit attempted to avoid questioning the purpose 
of the legislature.140  Although most of the licensing requirements related to 
pesticide rather than non-pesticide pest controllers, the court found a sufficient 
nexus in that the non-pesticide pest-controllers might encounter pesticides in 
the course of their work.141  The court questioned the government’s asserted 
objective only after finding that the exemption at issue bore no rational relation 
to the asserted health and safety interests of the state.142 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles 
focused heavily on the purpose behind the legislation.143  The court began by 
stating that the “[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete 
																																																																																																																																
special interests.”  459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983) (citation omitted) (upholding a Kansas law 
challenged under the Contracts Clause). 
 138. See supra Part. I.A.2 (discussing the two different approaches to rational basis review).  
This approach is similar to the test enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
 139. See infra notes 140–53 and accompanying text. 
 140. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the wide 
latitude courts should afford the legislative purpose).  Since the New Deal, courts have been 
particularly reluctant to look to the government purpose or interest behind legislation.  See supra 
notes 32–40 and accompanying text.  According to Justice William H. Rehnquist, actual purpose 
review “assumes that individual legislators are motivated by one discernable actual purpose, and 
ignores the fact that different legislators may vote for a single piece of legislation for widely 
different reasons.”  See Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702–03 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Antonin Scalia is skeptical of considering legislative history, 
for similar reasons.  See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and in judgment) (stating that “when the language of the statute is plain, 
legislative history is irrelevant” (citation omitted)). 
 141. Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 986–89.  Based on this reasoning, roofers and gutter cleaners 
should also be required to obtain training in the safe handling and disposal of pesticides.  Id. at 
987. 
 142. Id. at 991–92. 
 143. Compare Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the state’s 
proffered explanations for the licensure requirement, finding them to be mere pretext for 
protections of funeral directors from competition), with Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 986–91 
(acknowledging that the state had a legitimate purpose for requiring pest controllers to take a 
licensing exam, but, nevertheless, striking down the law because the exemption scheme had no 
rational basis). 
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interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”144  The court ultimately found that the requirement had no bearing 
on public safety, but instead had been passed for the purpose of protecting 
“licensed funeral directors from retail price competition.”145 
The Fifth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, took into account the purpose of the 
state legislature in determining whether the legislation was passed pursuant to 
a legitimate state interest.146  According to the court, “[t]he great deference due 
state economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness to the history of 
a challenged rule or the context of its adoption nor does it require courts to 
accept nonsensical explanations for regulation.”147  Although the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits148 both held that states do not have a legitimate interest in “mere 
economic protection of a particular industry,” the Fifth Circuit emphasized that 
under rational basis scrutiny “economic protectionism . . . may well be 
supported by a post hoc perceived rationale as in Williamson—without which 
it is aptly described as a naked transfer of wealth.”149  Nonetheless, under the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach, the government does not necessarily win.  
“[A]lthough rational basis review places no affirmative evidentiary burden on 
the government, plaintiffs may . . . negate a seemingly plausible basis for the 
law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”150  
Oddly, the Tenth Circuit took the same approach as the Sixth Circuit, but 
reached the opposite conclusion.151  The court considered only whether the 
funeral directing licensing requirement was enacted pursuant to a legitimate 
state purpose, finding that once the state meets the “legitimate state interest” 
condition, it also satisfies the “rational relationship” requirement.152 
The “legitimate purpose” and “rational basis” requirements are not simply 
tautological.  An approach that emphasizes the former potentially sweeps more 
broadly: if the legislation in question is not passed pursuant to a legitimate 
																																																								
 144. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224 (citations omitted).  According to the Sixth Circuit, “the 
question before this court is whether [the licensing requirement] . . . bears a rational relationship 
to any legitimate purpose other than protecting the economic interest of licensed funeral 
directors.”  Id. at 225. 
 145. Id. at 227–28; see supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 147. Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756, 2013 WL 1149579, at *8 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 148. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 149. Abbey, 2013 WL 1149579, at *5.  See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text 
(discussing the reasoning in Williamson).  Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 
483, 487 (1955). 
 150. Abbey, 2013 WL 1149579, at *6. 
 151. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding the Craigmiles 
decision “unsupportable”). 
 152. See id. at 1223–24. 
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governmental interest, there is no need to consider whether it is rationally 
related to that interest.153 
B.  Judicial Intervention Is Required Because State Legislatures Are 
Frequently “Captured” by Those They Seek to Regulate and Because They Are 
Poorly Suited to Check Licensing Excesses 
The rationale for judicial deference toward economic legislation is two-fold: 
(1) bad policies can be corrected at the ballot box;154 and (2) unelected judges 
should avoid questioning the elected representatives of the people on the basis 
of their own “economic theory.”155  According to the “public interest” view of 
regulation prevalent during the New Deal,156 legislatures impose regulations on 
industries in “the public interest” to prevent or correct market failures.157  
However, the rapid expansion of licensing regulations has encouraged 
economists to re-examine this view.158 
Since the 1960s, a number of regulatory economists have pointed out that 
there is “no plausible claim of market failure in certain regulated industries, 
																																																								
 153. See supra Part I.C.  The Merrifield opinion hence appears to be more narrowly decided 
than Craigmiles, because the Ninth Circuit questions the state’s true motivation only after finding 
that the exemption ran counter to the asserted purpose of the state. 
 154. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1962) (holding that the Court should not 
“sit as a super legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation” and that changes to the statue lie 
“not with us but with the body constituted to pass the laws . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 155. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in part, 
as recognized in Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 861–62 (1992) (explaining how the “clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were 
different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of [Lochner]”).  According to 
David E. Bernstein, “[l]eading Progressive lawyers believed in strong interventionist government 
run by experts and responsive to developing social trends, and were hostile to countervailing 
claims of rights-based limits on government power.”  BERNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 4. 
 156. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1243–48 (1986) (explaining that federal regulation for the public good under Roosevelt’s 
New Deal “applied to any sector of the economy that was malfunctioning [and] needed 
government-endorsed controls . . . to ‘make things right’” and that “comprehensive government 
intervention was not only useful . . . but an essential ingredient for maintaining a general state of 
equilibrium in the economy”). 
 157. See Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic Theory of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather 
than Rent Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771, 1771 (1999) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, 
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997)); 
see also BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE 
BAD POLICIES 3 (2008) (summarizing the public interest view that democracy works because it 
provides voters with what they want). 
 158. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (illustrating the broad scope of licensure 
regulations); see also George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?  The 
Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (1962) (challenging the purpose of regulations for 
investor-based utilities after studying the effect of regulations on the electric power industry and 
finding no significant variations in rates). 
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such as motor carriers and airlines.”159  In his seminal work, George J. Stigler, 
a Nobel Laureate economist, postulated that regulation, “as a rule . . . is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit.”160  In a similar vein, Walter Gellhorn noted that, although licensing 
occasionally has been imposed on an unwilling industry (for instance, on the 
securities industry after the financial scandals of 1929),161 it has more often 
been “eagerly sought—always on the purported ground that licensure protects 
the uninformed public . . . but invariably with the consequence that members 
of the licensed groups become protected against competition from 
newcomers.”162  Stigler’s economic theory of regulation explains why many 
new licensing regulations that tighten or create additional qualifications have 
grandfather clauses excusing those already in the business from having to 
comply with the reissued regulations.163  Where interest groups are able to 
																																																								
 159. See Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 1771; see also Stigler & Friedland, supra note 158, at 
1.  Occupational licensing may have initially improved the quality services in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, arguably due to the asymmetry of information in a period of rapid 
urbanization and migration.  MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING 
QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 20–24 (2006).  However, Morris M. Kleiner argues 
that during the second half of the 20th century, the expansion of occupational licensing has 
provided little consumer benefit, and was pushed through the legislature largely to restrict 
competition in labor markets in a time when trade unions were in decline.  Id. at 12–13, 31, 44, 
48–58, 97–98. 
 160. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
3, 3 (1971); see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 286 (1965) (tying the rise of  
special interest lobbying to the expansion of government, and arguing that “interest-group 
activity, measured in terms of organizational costs, is a direct function of the ‘profits’ expected 
from the political process”); Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 1772 (“The new learning that emerged 
in the early 1970s as ‘the economic theory of regulation’ can justly be attributed to George  
Stigler . . . . It proceeds from the historical observation that regulation was in many instances 
sought by, rather than imposed upon, the regulated industry, which is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the public interest story.  In the new learning, regulation, whether sought by industry or 
imposed upon it, ‘is designed and operated primarily for [the regulated firms’] benefit,’ and to the 
consumers’ detriment.”). 
 161. Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11–12 
(1976-1977) (providing, as an example of an unwilling inducstry, the securities industry after the 
financial collapse of 1929). 
 162. Id.  Walter Gellhorn’s historical finding was recently reaffirmed by Kleiner’s extensive 
monograph on the subject, which includes a detailed case study of Minnesota and Wisconsin, as 
well as a fifty-state survey of state licensing practices and their effects.  In Minnesota, for 
instance, Kleiner found that “licensing appears to be responsive to political pressure from 
occupational associations seeking to become regulated.”  See KLEINER, supra note 159, at 31. 
 163. For example, a recently enacted massage therapy licensing requirement—passed after 
fifteen years of lobbying—includes a grandfather clause exempting current therapists.  
Pennsylvania Department of State Reminds Massage Therapists of Licensing Deadline, PR 
NEWSWIRE.COM (July 14, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pennsyl 
vania-department-of-state-reminds-massage-therapists-of-licensing-deadline-125585403.html.  A 
similar law passed in Michigan exempted incumbent massage therapists from meeting the 
stringent new standards, which included five hundred hours of class time.  See Simon, supra note 
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obtain a competitive advantage by lobbying for special privileges, and where 
the costs created by those privileges are distributed broadly, the rationally 
ignorant voter is unlikely to even know about, let alone fight against, 
protectionist regulations.164  Meanwhile, potential competitors not yet in the 
market are poorly situated to lobby against such legislation.165 
A recent study of the Florida funeral industry demonstrates how industry 
lobbyists can advance their interests by capturing state licensing regimes.166  In 
1979, the Florida legislature “shook up the funeral industry” by passing 
legislation allowing “direct disposers” to perform cremations, a service that 
had previously been reserved for licensed funeral directors.167  This change 
																																																																																																																																
5 (noting that some of the exempted massage therapists may have never taken a class at an 
accredited school); see also Massage Therapy Certification: States that Regulate Massage and 
Licensing Info, NAT. HEALERS, http://www.naturalhealers.com/qa/massage.html (last visited Jan. 
5, 2013) (indicating that the use of grandfather clauses is a common state practice).  The Supreme 
Court has upheld such provisions because they protect the reliance interest of those who have 
already been in the field for a significant period of time.  See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U.S. 297, 305 (1976). 
 164. See CAPLAN, supra note 157, at 5, 97 (noting that voters, in contrast to interest groups, 
are “rationally ignorant” due to the influx of information, their limited ability to absorb it, and 
that their individual votes are highly unlikely to sway elections); see also Gellhorn, supra note 
161, at 12 & n.19 (noting that the citizenry likely has no special interest, and, therefore, is a less 
effective political force than special interest groups); Daniel B. Klein, The Demand for and 
Supply of Assurance, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 4–11 (2001) (embracing the free enterprise system). 
 165. See KLEINER, supra note 159, at 10. 
 166. See Judith Chevalier et al., Regulating Direct Cremations: The Cost of Seemingly Small 
Regulatory Changes (AEA 2011 Annual Meeting, Working Paper) (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2011conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=419; see also Adam 
Ozibek, Cremation Wars, MODELEDBEHAVIOR.COM (May 31, 2011), 
http://modeledbehavior.com/tag/occupational-licensing/.  The anti-competitive use of licensing 
laws has been prevalent in the funeral industry.  See Plaintiffs’ Reply to Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 5–6, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 10-2917“K”(S) (E.D. La. Nov. 
12, 2010) (citing Trade Regulation Rule; Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260,  
42260–71 (Sept. 24, 1982) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 453)).  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
studied the industry for seven years and in 1982 enacted 16 C.F.R. § 453 to counteract the 
exploitative practices of the funeral industry, which leveraged its control of state licensing boards 
to engage in deceitful practices harmful to consumers.  Id.; Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the 
United States Federal Trade Commission in Support of Neither Party at 4, 9–14, St. Joseph 
Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (taking no position on the constitutional 
issues presented, the FTC submitted the brief “to refute any suggestion that LEFDA’s licensing 
requirements further the purposes of the Funeral Rule,” and argued that the licensing requirement 
in St. Joseph Abbey was an anti-competitive measure).  Because the Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar decision opened the door to litigation under the Sherman Act, see supra note 14, the FTC and 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) have sued a number of boards for 
engaging in anti-competitive practices, including the American Medical Association, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the National Society of Professional 
Injuries.  See KLEINER, supra note 159, at 24–25 (noting the FTC and DOJ’s broad enforcement 
program designed to encourage competitive business practices). 
 167. See Chevalier et. al., supra note 166, at 3, 10 (noting that, in Florida, direct disposal 
facilities, unlike licensed funeral directors, were only allowed to offer direct or “no-frills” 
cremation). 
2013] Economic Protectionism Under Rational Basis Review 501 
introduced competition into the market, as direct disposal licenses were easier 
to obtain than funeral directing licenses. 168   By 1999, direct disposal 
technicians performed approximately twenty percent of cremations in the 
state.169  In an effort to “wipe out” this source of competition, the Florida 
Funeral Directors Association (FFDA) began a lobbying effort that eventually 
led to legislation that required direct disposers to have a licensed funeral 
director in charge of their facilities.170 
Finally, many licensing laws not only curb competition, but also stunt social 
mobility. 171   Licensing regulations are particularly harmful to low-income 
workers who have the requisite skills to compete, but lack either formal 
training or financial resources to meet the onerous licensure requirements.172  
Additionally, licensing examinations are often only offered in English, which 
poses an additional hurdle for ethnic minorities.173  State licensing laws also 
give an extraordinary amount of discretion to independent boards174 that have 
historically abused their power by keeping ethnic minorities out of many 
markets.175 
																																																								
 168. Id. at 3.  Although individuals could become licensed direct disposers with only a high 
school degree and a few courses, prospective funeral directors were required to complete two 
years of college education, one year in mortuary school, and an apprenticeship.  Id. 
 169. Id. at 6, 11. 
 170. Id. at 3–4 (detailing a series of amendments to the funeral directing and direct disposal 
licensing regimes, passed at the behest of the Florida Funeral Directors Association between 2000 
and 2010).  Such legislation increased cremation costs for consumers.  Id. at 7–8 (finding that 
consumers were forced to pay an additional $3.5 million in 1996 due to the new regulations). 
 171. See Gellhorn, supra note 161, at 18 (noting that “[m]any economically deprived young 
people cannot easily meet the qualifications demanded of applicants, such as paying tuition to 
pseudo-professional schools or undergoing needlessly prolonged period of apprenticeship”). 
 172. Id.  Even if licensing laws are enacted with the best intention, they have been 
particularly harmful to black skilled workers.  David Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical 
Example of the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 89, 90 (1994).  For instance, “[o]nce the [American Medical Association] took control of 
the licensing procedure . . . state physician licensing . . . forced five of seven existing black 
medical schools—those that educated most black doctors—to close.”  Id. at 93. 
 173. See Gellhorn, supra note 161, at 18 (noting the difficulties for Spanish speakers and 
foreign-born workers). 
 174. Licensing boards frequently seek to protect members during times of economic stress by 
increasing barriers to entry, such as expanding training or apprenticeship requirements or by 
raising the passing mark to reduce the percentage of applicants who pass the entrance exam.  See 
KLEINER, supra note 159, at 44. 
 175. See Bernstein, supra note 172, at 93–102 (noting how licensing boards, which 
frequently required membership in white-only unions, excluded African Americans and other 
ethnic minorities from many occupations, such as plumbing and hair-cutting).  Even during the 
Progressive Era, the judiciary often upheld state licensing authority without considering how the 
licenses were administered: “The judges of the day, infused with Progressive optimism about the 
benevolence of government and the value of institutionalized expertise, seem to have had little or 
no awareness of the misuses to which licensing laws could so easily be put.”  Id. at 95. 
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III.  THE COURT SHOULD APPLY HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TO 
PROTECTIONIST STATE LAWS 
Unlike intermediate and strict scrutiny, “heightened” rational basis review is 
poorly defined.176  Regardless of the terminology used, the Supreme Court 
needs to address the issue of whether protectionism that favors domestic 
industries is a legitimate governmental interest. 
Holding that such protectionism is not a legitimate government interest 
would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent in two respects.  First, the 
Court has moved away from the expansive approach used in Lee Optical and 
Dukes by rejecting state laws and economic regulations that single out 
individuals or groups by arbitrarily imposing a special hardship or capriciously 
denying them some benefit enjoyed by similarly situated groups.177  These 
cases are analogous to licensing laws that arbitrarily include or exclude a 
particular group.  For example, the laws in Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily imposing regulations of one 
group (funeral morticians) on an unrelated group (casket retailers). 178  
Similarly, the valuation method at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
arbitrarily treated dissimilar groups alike by relying heavily on the most recent 
sales price.179  In contrast, the provision at issue in Merrifield arbitrarily treated 
similar groups differently by selectively defining the word “vertebrates,”180 
just as the Village in Olech arbitrarily imposed a more burdensome easement 
requirement on the plaintiff than on similarly situated neighbors.181 
																																																								
 176. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying a “heightened” 
form of rational basis review in a case involving a permit to construct a home for the mentally 
handicapped), superseded by statute, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§  
3601–3616, as recognized in Human Res. & Mgmt. Grp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp. 2d 
237, 256 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 177. See supra Part I.B.2.i. 
 178. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 
700 F.3d 154, 168–69 (5th Cir. 2012), question certified for the Louisiana Supreme Court by 700 
F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2012), certification denied by St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 106 So. 3d 542 (La. 
2013); see also supra Parts I.C.1, I.C.4 (discussing the two courts’ determinations that the 
arbitrary regulations essentially gave funeral directors a monopoly on cremations, without any 
benefit to the public). 
 179. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1989) 
(failing to incorporate the assessment of land not recently sold, which resulted in grossly 
disproportionate tax rates); see also supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 180. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (evaluating a California law 
that exempted practitioners of non-pesticides-based pest control from a two-year licensing 
process only if they captured and removed vertebrate pests, which narrowly included animals 
such as “bats, raccoons, skunks, and squirrels,” but not “mice, rats or pigeons”); see also supra 
Part I.C.3. 
 181. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000) (addressing a village law 
that required the plaintiff to grant the village a thirty-three foot easement onto her property, but 
only required similarly situated property owners to grant a fifteen-foot easement). 
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Second, economic research and historical developments have undercut the 
rationale for extreme deference to licensing regulations.182  Empirical studies, 
such as the one conducted by Morris Kleiner, have bolstered the contention 
that industries often shape the manner in which they are regulated to their  
own advantage.183  This theory, known as “industry capture,” is particularly 
pertinent to protectionist state licensing laws because the benefits of such 
regulations are highly concentrated and the costs to consumers are widely 
dispersed.184  Moreover, individuals seeking to enter the market frequently lack 
the power to resist or challenge such legislation.185  Although judges should 
proceed with caution,186 complete judicial abstention in these circumstances is 
inappropriate due to the institutional weaknesses of the political process and 
the vulnerability of regulators to political capture.187 
In light of these two considerations, the Court should adopt a two-step 
approach to evaluate licensing regulations.  First, the Court should ask whether 
the regulation in question was enacted pursuant to a legitimate government 
interest.188  If no legitimate interest exists, the Court should invalidate the law.  
Second, if the end is legitimate, the Court should determine whether the law 
itself is rationally related to that end.189 
This two-step analysis need not entail a “return to Lochner,”190 for the reach 
of rational basis review under this approach would be limited by the following 
																																																								
 182. See infra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that licensing 
requirements have on minorities). 
 186. Under the suggested method of review, judges would not substitute their policy 
preferences for those of legislators, but instead would merely ensure that legislators do not 
arbitrarily discriminate, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
 187. See supra Part II.B; see also KLEINER, supra note 159, at 32–35 (describing how a case 
study that examined how licensing regulations are passed found that the health industry in 
Minnesota, which saw the greatest expansion of licensing requirements between 1981 and 2003, 
was also the greatest source of campaign contributions at the state level). 
 188. In a constitutional system of limited government, the Court should begin by considering 
the purpose the governmental interest.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). 
 189. In reality, many courts may apply a sliding-scale approach, in which the presence of 
provisions that strongly undermine the state interest promoted by the legislation may be taken as 
evidence that the real (and illegitimate) purpose of the legislation is to protect favored interests.  
See, e.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the legislature’s 
exemption of certain pests was arbitrary and, therefore, improper). 
 190. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).  This approach is consistent with 
the shift away from the extreme stance taken in Dukes and Lee Optical.  In fact, in his dissent in 
Lochner, Justice John Marshall Harlan endorsed a similar approach: 
If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power extends, 
and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best, are yet not 
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two principles.  First, even if a law advances multiple interests, the “legitimate 
interest” test may be satisfied as long as one of the interests advanced by the 
state is legitimate.191  Second, a law may satisfy the “rational relationship” test 
as long as it is not contrary 192  or irrelevant 193  to the government interest 
advanced by the law. 194   These two limitations are consistent with the 
presumption that economic legislation is constitutional, unless it employs some 
invidious classification.195 
In the case of the most onerous licensing regulations, such as the 
requirement that casket retailers become licensed morticians, the courts should 
hold that the law fails to meet the “legitimate interest” requirement.196  Most 
legislation that meets the first hurdle will likely be upheld, although many 
individual provisions that are contrary to the legislation, such as grandfather 
clauses, will be invalidated.197 
This will allow courts to check abusive legislation, while respecting the state 
legislatures’ role by upholding the licensing regulation as a whole.  In 
Merrifield, the Ninth Circuit took this approach by preserving the pest control 
licensing law but striking the discriminatory amendment that was added after 
the initial enactment of the legislation.198  In some instances, however, there 
would be no legitimate interest in striking down one individual provision, 
																																																																																																																																
plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot interfere.  In other 
words, when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden of proof, so to speak, is 
upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), 
overruled in part, as recognized in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1962). 
 191. For instance, if a state passes a licensing requirement with the dual intentions of 
protecting incumbent professionals from competition and addressing some public health concern, 
the law satisfies the “legitimate purpose” test, and it is constitutional as long as it also meets the 
“rational relationship” test. 
 192. See, e.g., Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 981–82 (noting that the selective definition of 
“vertebrates” that exempt pest controllers who dealt with “bats, raccoons, skunks, and squirrels” 
but not “mice, rats, or pigeons” ran counter to the logic of the licensing requirement). 
 193. Presumably, obtaining a license in cosmetology is irrelevant to the profession of hair 
braiding, and learning to embalm corpses is irrelevant to the profession of crafting and selling 
caskets.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the licensing requirements in many 
states for hair braiding); Parts I.C.1–2, I.C.4 (discussing cases challenging licensing requirements 
for selling caskets). 
 194. As the Court has often stated, a law need not be perfectly constructed as long as it is 
rationally related to some legitimate governmental purpose.  See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). 
 195. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 196. In such extreme cases, no “sophisticated economic analysis will be necessary to see the 
pretextual nature of the state’s proffered explanations.”  Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
 197. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  
§ 3531.9.4 (3d ed.) (providing an overview of the Supreme Court’s approach to severability). 
 198. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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unless the law contained a constitutional severability clause, because the 
legislation may never have passed in the first place without such a clause.199 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits correctly held that intrastate 
protectionism is not a legitimate purpose under rational basis review.  Given 
the disagreement among the circuits on the issue, the Supreme Court should 
resolve the issue by adopting the two-step approach proposed in this Comment.  
This approach would result in the wholesale invalidation of the most abusive 
laws, without undermining the states’ role in passing licensure laws.  Further, 
by providing victims of protectionist licensing regimes the opportunity to 
challenge provisions that run counter to the interest asserted by the state (such 
as the grandfather clauses), this test would reduce the incentives to pass such 























 199. See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) (indicating 
that the courts should avoid leaving the remainder of an act in place when “it is evident that the 
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of 
that which is not.”).  But see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–46 (2005) (holding that 
the Court should preserve the constitutional portions of an act, as long as they are capable of 
functioning independently, and in a manner consistent with congressional intent). 
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